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Abstract
In this article, we argue that the science–policy interface can be understood as a discourse network constituted by discur-
sive interaction between scientific organizations and other actors that both use scientific arguments in conjunction with
other policy arguments. We use discourse network analysis to investigate the climate change policy process in Finland be-
tween 2002 and 2015, focusing on the role of and relationships between scientific actors and arguments in the discourse
networks. Our data consist of policy actors’ written testimonies on two law proposals, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
(2002) and the enactment of the Finnish Climate Law (2015). Our results show that two competing discourse coalitions
have influenced the development of climate change policy in the 2000s. In 2002, the dominant coalition was economic,
prioritizing economic growth over climate change mitigation. In 2015, the climate coalition that argued for ambitious miti-
gation measures became dominant. The majority of scientific actors were part of the dominant economy coalition in 2002
and part of the dominant ecology coalition in 2015. The centrality of scientific arguments increased over time, and both
discourse coalitions used them progressively more. These developments reflect the increasingly central position of science
in Finnish climate policymaking. We contribute to the literature on the science–policy interface by operationalizing the in-
terface as a set of connections in a discourse network and by showing how the analysis of discourse networks and their
properties can help us understand the shifts in the role of science in policymaking over time.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is a policy sector in which the role
of scientific information is particularly salient. The
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change, established
in 1988 to provide policymakers with information about
climate change, has produced a tremendous amount of
knowledge on the various impacts of anthropogenic cli-
mate change. However, there has been a discrepancy be-
tween the amount of scientific knowledge and the pol-
icy responses to climate change. The reasons for this
mismatch are manifold, but one factor is particularly im-
portant in climate policymaking: Environmental policies,
such as climate policy, are ultimately about reconciliation
between different values and interests (Hoffman, 2015;
Hulme, 2009; Layzer, 2016). Consequently, climate science
cannot dictate policy action nor escape the social world:
Policy actors tend to make their own interpretations of
scientific knowledge and use it selectively in congruence
with their own values and preferences (Pielke, 2002).
The literature on the science–policy interface exam-
ines this exact dilemma—that is, the often-complicated
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relationship between science and policy. This literature
has identified many contextual factors that complicate
the functioning of this interface (Bremer & Glavovic,
2013; Dilling & Lemos, 2011; Lacey, Howden, Cvitanovic,
& Colvin, 2018; Lahsen, 2009; Pielke, 2010; Runhaar &
Nieuwaal, 2010). One of these factors—the politicization
of science—is particularly salient for the climate science–
policy interface (Brown, 2015; Pielke, 2010; Sarewitz,
2004;Weingart, 1999;Wesselink, Buchanan,Georgiadou,
& Turnhout, 2013). By politicization, we refer to the pro-
cess whereby science becomes part of general value and
power struggles in society (Pielke, 2010; Sarewitz, 2004).
In keepingwith this definition, politicization does not nec-
essarily mean that scientific facts are denied or scien-
tific actors confronted on political grounds, even though
such things do take place in climate change politics, par-
ticularly in the US (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Instead,
the politicization of science is a wider discursive process
whereby policy actors interpret scientific knowledge and
assess its policy implications in varied ways, and they use
it selectively in public debates to support their own po-
litical and ideological goals (Bremer & Glavovic, 2013;
Runhaar & Nieuwaal, 2010; Sarewitz, 2004; Weingart,
1999). Scholars have argued that the politicization of sci-
ence has paradoxically accelerated as the role of science
and scientific actors has strengthened in policymaking in
recent decades (Pielke, 2002; Weingart, 1999).
This article examines the science–policy interface
from a novel perspective, using discourse network analy-
sis (DNA; Leifeld 2019). DNA examines political discourse
as a network in which policy actors group into compet-
ing discourse coalitions based on shared discourses. Our
relational approach offers a novel tool to systematically
analyze the science–policy interface. Using DNA, we can
zoom in on the role and relationships of scientific actors
and arguments in the policy debate by examining ques-
tions such as the following: Which discourse coalitions
are scientific actors a part of? How central are scientific
actors and arguments, compared to other policy actors
and arguments, in the policy debate? We argue that by
analyzing these relational properties, we can better un-
derstand the science–policy interface.
Our empirical case is Finland, where scientific knowl-
edge has enjoyed a relatively strong position in policy
processes. According to recent studies, however, science
in relation to climate change policy has become politi-
cized in Finland in the 2000s (Hildén, 2011; Kerkkänen,
2010; Leipola, 2018). Our data consist of 86 written tes-
timonies given by policy actors in official consultation
processes regarding two key events in Finnish climate
policymaking—the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
(2002) and the enactment of the Finnish Climate Law
(Finnish Government, 2015).
2. Literature and Research Questions
The literature on the science–policy interface analyzes
the relationship between science and policy by examin-
ing the configuration of actors that are “involved in the
production, mediation, and application of [scientific] in-
formation” (Kettle, Trainor, & Loring, 2017, p. 2). Based
on the early models, the science–policy interface was
conceptualized as a linear process whereby science and
policy formed a close partnership in regard to the reso-
lution of political problems (Weingart, 1999). However,
this model has since experienced a significant reversal.
Some scholars have concluded that the availability of sci-
entific knowledge alone does not guarantee effective or
desirable policy outcomes (Lahsen, 2009; Pielke, 2010;
Wesselink et al., 2013).
In this literature, many factors that intervene in
the interface resulting from the science and policy end
have been identified. Intrinsic factors related to the pro-
duction of scientific information itself can complicate
the interface. These factors include the relevance of
scientific information to policymakers, the ineffective
communication of scientific uncertainty to policymak-
ers and the scientists’ inadequate understanding of the
decision-making context (Dilling& Lemos, 2011; Runhaar
& Nieuwaal, 2010). Contextual factors related to the
policymaking environment are also numerous and in-
clude institutional and financial barriers, such as hav-
ing few collaborative structures between scientists and
policymakers or having too few resources (Bremer &
Glavovic, 2013; Dilling & Lemos, 2011). With regard to
climate change policymaking, some scholars have iden-
tified numerous crucial factors that influence the func-
tioning of the science–policy interface. For instance, they
have looked at how scientific information flows in cli-
mate policy networks between the producers and users
of scientific knowledge (Kettle et al., 2017; Wagner et al.,
2020) and how political and cultural factors, such as po-
litical culture and geopolitics, impede the use of scien-
tific knowledge in climate policymaking (Lahsen, 2009).
Having too little or toomuch trust in the climate–science
policy interface can also complicate the use of scientific
knowledge in policymaking (Lacey et al., 2018).
One strand of this literature examines the politiciza-
tion of science in discursive processes. Discourse is de-
fined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories
through which meaning is given to phenomenon” (Hajer
& Versteeg, 2005, p. 75). Discursive approaches to the
science–policy interface note that scientific and tech-
nical knowledge is always interpreted in a specific so-
cial and political context (Dryzek, 2005; Jasanoff, 2004;
Wesselink et al., 2013). Policy actors play a crucial role
in how they frame and selectively use scientific re-
sults (Jasanoff, 2004; Weingart, 1999; Wesselink et al.,
2013). According to these perspectives, science tends
to be politicized in discursive processes: Policy actors
construct differing, often competing discourses about
scientific knowledge and its policy implications based
on their different values and interests (Forsyth, 2012;
Pielke, 2010; Sarewitz, 2004).This literature also suggests
that as science and scientific actors become an impor-
tant part of the policy process, this simultaneously leads
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to the increased politicization of science (Pielke, 2002;
Weingart, 1999).
However, previous studies on the politicization of sci-
ence rarely offer systematic tools to analyze these dis-
cursive processes, and when they do, they often down-
play the fact that political discourse is a relational phe-
nomenon: Policy discourses involving scientific organiza-
tions and actors are formed in the interactions between
policy actors. We aim to fill this gap by using DNA, which
is a combination of qualitative content analysis and quan-
titative network analysis (Leifeld, 2017). DNA offers a sys-
tematic tool to analyze several properties of the science–
policy interface, such as the existence of competing dis-
course coalitions and the centrality of scientific actors
and arguments in discourse networks in relation to other
policy actors and arguments. A discourse coalition is a
group of political actors in the public spherewhosemem-
bers share a similar empirical or normative interpreta-
tion of a policy issue (Hajer, 1993). Studies argue that
discourse coalitions have a significant impact on policy
processes by shaping policy priorities and framing policy
problems in different ways (Bulkeley, 2000; Hajer, 1993;
Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila, & Broadbent, 2017; Kukkonen
et al., 2018; Leifeld & Haunss, 2012; Rennkamp, Haunss,
Wongsa, Ortegad, & Casamadrid, 2017). Centrality, in
turn, is a network property that demonstrates the impor-
tance of a node in the whole network. In our case, it indi-
cates whether scientific actors are central in the climate
policy discourse and howwidely scientific arguments are
used to support other policy arguments.
Discourse network properties such as these have an
important impact on policy processes (Leifeld & Haunss,
2012).We argue that analyzing these properties and their
changes is useful for understanding the science–policy in-
terface and the shifts in the use of science in policy pro-
cesses over time. Our research questions are as follows:
RQ1: What kind of discourse coalitions are present
in the Finnish climate change policy process between
2002 and 2015, and how central are scientific actors?
RQ2: How central are scientific arguments, and what
other types of policy arguments are they used in con-
junction with?
3. Case, Data, and Methods
Studies have suggested that in regard to climate policy-
making in Finland, science has become a target of politi-
cal battles in the 2000s (Hildén, 2011; Kerkkänen, 2010;
Leipola, 2018). According to these studies, political ac-
tors have used scientific knowledge selectively and to ad-
vance their own political goals. In 2017, for instance, the
Finnish Climate Change Panel published a report inwhich
it warned the government that the plans to increase log-
ging would decrease carbon sinks for decades (Seppälä
et al., 2017). However, the report was interpreted in
contradictory ways, and the Finnish government even
used it to defend additional logging (Leipola, 2018). In
general, climate change policymaking has been contro-
versial in Finland. Finnish climate policy has been influ-
enced to a great extent by the heavy industry, whose
lobby has been able to hinder effective climate policy-
making by framing climate change in an unfavorable
way, namely by arguing that climate change mitigation
will hurt economic growth and national competitiveness
(Hildén, 2011; Kerkkänen, 2010). Finland is economically
reliant on the success of its export industry, such as the
forest and metal industry, which explains the significant
influence of these industries. Research has also shown
that the Finnish government has strong collaborative ties
to the heavy industry in regard to climate policymak-
ing and few ties to NGOs and research organizations
(Gronow&Ylä-Anttila, 2019; Gronow, Ylä-Anttila, Carson,
& Edling, 2019; Teräväinen, 2010).
In this article, we examine the role of science in
Finnish climate change policymaking between 2002 and
2015, which is a key period in the formation of Finnish cli-
mate policy. Based on the literature reviewed above, we
expect to find that the role of science in climate change
policy discourse has become increasingly central over
the course of these years.
Our data consist of 86 written testimonies given by
policy actors from different sectors regarding two law
proposals: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002
and the enactment of the Finnish Climate Law in 2015.
We chose to analyze these two events because they con-
stitutemajor landmarks in Finnish climate change legisla-
tion. Both law proposals have undergone an official con-
sultation process, providing uswith testimonies frompol-
icy actors and thereby enabling us to investigate the role
of scientific actors and arguments over time.
Finland ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. Finland’s
obligation under the protocol was to keep its greenhouse
gas emissions at the 1990 level. As part of the EU’s cli-
mate change legislation, Finland has been obliged, for
instance, to join the EU’s Emissions Trading System, re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions in non-Emissions Trading
System sectors according to the EU’s joint burden-
sharing agreement, and increase the share of renewable
energy in its energy production).
The Finnish Climate Law came into force in June 2015.
It is a framework law that sets up a system to plan, co-
ordinate, and track Finnish climate change policymak-
ing in non-Emissions Trading System sectors. The Finnish
Climate Law does not include any substantive legisla-
tion for different policy sectors, businesses, or citizens,
but it includes a binding long-term emission target for
Finland—that is, an 80% reduction by 2050, compared
to the 1990 emission levels. The law strengthens the role
of the Finnish Parliament, enhances different stakehold-
ers’ participation in Finnish climate policymaking, and es-
tablishes and identifies the role of the Finnish Climate
Change Panel as an advisory body to the government in
climate policymaking. The Finnish Climate Law changed
the division of labor between the different ministries
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to some extent. The Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Employment is still responsible for the implementation
of EU’s climate change legislation in Finland, which has
been carried out via national climate and energy strate-
gies since 2001. The Ministry of Environment is respon-
sible for the coordination of UN and EU climate negotia-
tions, as well as sectors such as land use, waste manage-
ment, and construction. Along with the Finnish Climate
Law, the Ministry of Environment’s mandate for climate
and energy policy was expanded to include the respon-
sibility for coordinating the medium-term climate policy
plan. The Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry remains
responsible for issues related to the use of forests.
During the official consultation procedures linked to
most major legislative processes in Finland, the respon-
sible ministry sends requests for a written testimony to
a group of policy actors that represent the most impor-
tant stakeholders in Finnish climate change policy. These
include business and trade organizations, NGOs, and sci-
entific organizations. Table 1 lists the organizational affil-
iations of the policy actors that gave written testimonies
in 2002 and 2015.
The testimony is a free-form text in which the pol-
icy actor expresses support for or opposition to the law
proposal at hand and justifies its position. These tes-
timonies are publicly available from the government’s
electronic archives (Finnish Government, 2019). The re-
sponsible ministry collects the testimonies and consid-
ers them when preparing the law. In the case of the
Kyoto Protocol, we have no information on how many
requests for testimony were sent, but 30 policy actors
delivered written testimonies. In the case of the Finnish
Climate Law, 81 policy actors were contacted and 69 de-
livered written testimonies. In their testimonies, some
policy actors merely stated that they had no comments
or they expressed support for the law proposal with-
out justifying their position. These testimonies are ex-
cluded from the final data set because they do not in-
clude any policy arguments for analysis. The final data
set includes 22 testimonies from 2002 and 64 from 2015.
The Supplementary File includes the list of policy actors
that delivered testimonies.
Using the DNA software (Leifeld, 2019), we coded
all the policy statements that were included in the testi-
monies. These statements represent general arguments
that policy actors use to defendor oppose/raise concerns
over the law proposal. The arguments could deal with
causes, definitions, or solutions related to the law pro-
posal at hand. We distinguished between general pol-
icy arguments and scientific arguments. Scientific argu-
ments differ from other policy arguments in that they
draw on scientific research or refer to scientific actors.
We assigned the statements to different argument
categories, which were formed inductively during the
coding process. For each statement, we coded four at-
tributes: name of the person, name of the organization,
the argument category referred to by the organization
(called ‘concept’ in the DNA context), and agreement
or disagreement with the argument category. One tes-
timony could include multiple statements.
For example, the following statement belongs to the
argument category ‘climate science supports the enact-
ment of the Finnish Climate Law’:
Scientific evidence on anthropogenic climate change
is strong. The assessments of the impacts of climate
change on people, societies, and the environment
at different time scales have been done based on
the existing scientific knowledge. To avoid the uncon-
trolled consequences of climate change, actions to
reduce GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions are really
needed. Enacting the Finnish Climate Law is one way
of systematizing the matter. (Ministry of Transport
and Communications, 2014)
This is classified as a scientific argument. The follow-
ing statement, which belongs to the argument category
‘Climate Law could weaken economic growth and na-
tional competitiveness,’ is an example of a nonscien-
tific policy argument: “Well managed commercial forests
store carbon most effectively. The Finnish Climate Law
could restrict this type of rational action…and lead to
unnecessary restrictions for the forest industry” (Forest
Owners’ Association of Finland, 2014).
Table 1. Organizational affiliations of policy actors giving written testimonies in 2002 and 2015.
Ratification of the Enactment of the Finnish
Kyoto Protocol (2002) Climate Law (2015)
N % N %
Business and trade organization 10 45 19 30
Government 5 23 10 16
Environmental NGO 3 14 7 11
Scientific organization 4 18 11 17
NGO 0 0 9 14
Municipal government 0 0 4 6
Business 0 0 3 5
Other 0 0 1 1
Total 22 100 64 100
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Table 2. The final dataset.
Policy actors Statements Concepts (argument categories)
Kyoto Protocol (2002) 22 119 28
Finnish Climate Law (2015) 64 342 29
The coding procedure resulted in 28 argument cat-
egories in the case of the Kyoto Protocol and 29 in the
case of the Finnish Climate Law (Table 2). However, when
exporting the data to the social network analysis soft-
ware, we included only the most common argument cat-
egories (Kyoto ratification: more than three mentions by
actors; Climate Law: more than six mentions by actors).
This resulted in 17 argument categories in the case of the
Kyoto Protocol and 15 in the case of the Finnish Climate
Law. The selected argument categories represent 85% of
all statements in both cases (for a full list of the argu-
ment categories, see the Supplementary File). Tables 3
and 4 list the argument categories and their abbrevia-
tions (used in the figures in the results section) for our
two data time points, 2002 and 2015.
After coding, we created one-mode co-occurrence
networks of policy actors and argument categories us-
ing the DNA software. In our case, the co-occurrence
of actors and arguments is based on congruence. This
means that policy actors share a tie in the discourse net-
Table 3. Argument categories and abbreviations during the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (2002).
Kyoto Protocol (2002)
Argument category Agree/disagree (N) N Shortened form
Kyoto Protocol could weaken economic growth and 13/0 13 Economic growth and national
national competitiveness competitiveness
Finland should use nuclear energy to reduce GHG emissions 9/2 11 Nuclear energy
Energy efficiency is essential in the reduction of GHGs 8/0 8 Energy efficiency
Finland’s emission targets should not be tightened 7/0 7 Emission targets not tightened
Kyoto Protocol promotes the use of renewable energy 6/1 7 Renewable energy
Kyoto Protocol should include large emitters 6/0 6 Large emitters
Climate science supports the ratification of 6/0 6 Climate science
the Kyoto Protocol
Finland should invest in Research & Development 6/0 6 Research and development
to reduce GHG emissions
Finnish industry’s emissions are as low as possible 5/0 5 Finnish industry has low
emissions
The Emissions Trading System is problematic 4/0 4 Emissions Trading System is
problematic
Kyoto Protocol creates economic growth 4/0 4 Economic growth
Economic studies support the ratification of 4/0 4 Economic studies
the Kyoto Protocol
Finland should use the Kyoto mechanisms to 4/0 4 Kyoto mechanisms
reduce GHG emissions
Finland should be able to decide independently 4/0 4 National decision-making
how it will reduce its GHG emissions
More studies on the economic impacts of the 4/0 4 Studies on economic impacts
Kyoto Protocol are needed
The law proposal’s calculations are incorrect 4/0 4 Incorrect calculations
Finland should not ban coal-condensing plants 4/0 4 Coal-condensing plants not
banned
Note: Scientific arguments are marked in bold.
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Table 4. Argument categories and abbreviations during the enactment of the Finnish Climate Law (2015).
Finnish Climate Law (2005)
Argument category Agree/Disagree (%) N Abbreviation
Climate Law should include a long-term emission target 23/18 41 Long-term emission target
Climate science supports the enactment of the Finnish 27/2 29 Climate science
Climate Law
Climate Law improves the coordination and planning 24/0 24 Coordination and planning
of Finnish climate policymaking
Climate Law strengthens transparency and participation 23/1 24 Transparency and participation
in Finnish climate policymaking
Climate Law could weaken economic growth and 23/0 23 Economic growth and national
national competitiveness competitiveness
Finnish Climate Change Panel should have legal status 16/4 20 Legal status of the climate
change panel
Energy policy should be the focus of climate policy 19/1 20 Energy policy
Climate Law is unnecessary and overlaps with current 19/0 19 Law Is unnecessary
legislation
Climate Law burdens the administration 19/0 19 Administrative burden
Emissions Trading System should be included in the 13/4 17 Inclusion of Emissions Trading
long-term emission target System
More studies on the economic impacts of the Finnish 14/0 14 Studies on economic impacts
Climate Law are needed
Climate Law creates economic growth 13/0 13 Economic growth
Climate Law improves the image of Finnish climate policy 11/0 11 Image of Finnish climate policy
Social scientific studies support the enactment of 8/0 8 Social scientific studies
the Finnish Climate Law
Finnish Climate Change Panel should include 7/0 7 Scientific representation of the
representation from different scientific fields climate change panel
Note: Scientific arguments are marked in bold.
work if they both agree or both disagree with an argu-
ment. Argument categories share a tie if a same pol-
icy actor uses these two argument categories in a testi-
mony, agreeing or disagreeingwith both categories. Edge
weights are often normalized to better identify coalitions
frommedia discourse networks in which there is a signif-
icant degree of conflict present and the actors’ levels of
activity differ (Leifeld, 2017). Our data, in contrast, con-
sist of written testimonies in which policy actors usually
express their perspectives without criticizing others, and
each actor gives only one testimony, resulting in a net-
work with few conflict ties. Consequently, we did not nor-
malize edge weights. Additionally, we did not use thresh-
old values due to the relatively small size of the data.
Using the Gephi software package, we analyzed
the positions and relationships of scientific organiza-
tions and scientific arguments in the discourse net-
works. We used two techniques of social network ana-
lysis: the Louvain clustering algorithm and the measur-
ing of closeness centrality. First, we used the Louvain
algorithm to divide the network into communities. The
algorithm counts a modularity score with a value of
between −1 and 1, which measures the density of
the links inside communities compared to the links be-
tween them (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre,
2008). Clustering the actor networks allowed us outline
the competing discourse coalitions and to determine
which coalitions the scientific organizations are a part of.
Clustering the argument network, in turn, made it pos-
sible to examine which types of arguments are grouped
together—that is, used by the same actors in their tes-
timonies. This indicated what type of policy arguments
scientific arguments are most strongly connected to.
Second, we used closeness centrality to analyze the
network position of the policy actors and arguments. We
chose this measure because it takes into account how
central a node is in the whole network, calculating the
average number of steps that must be taken for a node
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to reach all the other nodes in the network (Freeman,
1979). To control for the size of the network, closeness
scores were normalized so that their values lie between
zero and one. The closeness centrality score indicates
how central the actor/argument is in the whole network
across its subgroups. Bearing the limitations of the re-
search design in mind, an actor or argument with a high
centrality score can be interpreted as having an impor-
tant role in the policy discourse (for alternative meth-
ods of analyzing the position of different actors and argu-
ments in a discourse network, see, e.g., Buckton, Fergie,
Leifeld, & Hilton, 2019; Fisher, Waggle, & Leifeld, 2013).
4. Results
In this section, we present and analyze four network di-
agrams that illustrate the position and relationships of
scientific organizations and arguments in the discourse
networks—first in 2002 and then in 2015. The closeness
centrality of an actor/argument is reported as a number
in parentheses after the name of each actor/argument.
Figure 1 illustrates the actor network during the rat-
ification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. We identified
two competing discourse coalitions in the network us-
ing modularity. Based on their arguments (Figure 2),
we refer to them as the economy coalition and the cli-
mate coalition. The economy coalition is dominant: It
includes 14 actors while the climate coalition has 8. It
also includes the majority of the most central actors in
the network.
Among the most central actors in the network are
two scientific actors, and they belong to the domi-
nant economy coalition. These are the VTT Technical
Research Center of Finland (0.95) and the VATT Institute
Figure 1. One-mode network of actors via argument categories during the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (2002). Notes:
Node size adjusted based on closeness centrality; ties based and weighted according to congruence. Modularity: 0.203.
Red: scientific organization; blue: business organization/trade union; yellow: government; green: environmental NGO;
brown: NGO; orange: municipal organization; purple: business; pink: others. Selected actors are labeled to ensure read-
ability of the figure. The color of each edge is the average of the colors of the two nodes that the edge connects.
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for Economic Research (0.88). These scientific actors are
sectoral research institutes that have an established role
in Finnish legislative processes, providing background re-
ports and calculations for the government. Based on
agreement, they are allied with business and trade orga-
nizations, such as the Confederation of Finnish Industries
(0.84), Finnish Forest Industries (0.84), and the Central
Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (0.84). Earlier re-
search has demonstrated that these organizations are
among the most powerful in regard to climate change
policy processes in Finland (Gronow & Ylä-Anttila, 2019;
Gronow et al., 2019). The economy coalition also in-
cludes ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance (0.7)
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (0.7).
Scientific actors are also represented in the compet-
ing, less dominant climate coalition, but they are not
as central as the scientific actors in the economy coali-
tion. The scientific actors in the climate coalition are
the two environmental research institutes, the Finnish
Environment Institute (0.66) and the Finnish Institute for
Marine Research (0.64). These scientific actors form the
climate coalition together with organizations such as the
Ministry of Environment (0.72), theMinistry of Education
(0.57), and the Confederation of Unions for Professional
and Managerial Staff (0.95), as well as environmen-
tal NGOs such as the Finnish Association for Nature
Conservation (0.7) and the World Wildlife Foundation
Finland (0.7). These organizations play a less powerful
role in Finnish climate change policymaking than the or-
ganizations belonging to the economy coalition (Gronow
& Ylä-Anttila, 2019; Gronow et al., 2019).
Figure 2 shows what types of arguments are central
in the network and how their use is divided between the
two coalitions. Scientific arguments (red nodes) are not
Figure 2.One-mode network of arguments via actors during the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (2002). Notes: Node size
adjusted based on closeness centrality; ties based and weighted according to congruence. Modularity: 0.225. Red: scien-
tific argument; blue: other policy argument. The color of each edge is the average of the colors of the two nodes that the
edge connects.
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central in the network. Policy actors mainly use policy ar-
guments other than scientific arguments to defend the
Kyoto Protocol (climate coalition) or raise doubts about
its implementation in Finland (economy coalition). The
most central arguments of the economy coalition are
that the Kyoto Protocol could weaken economic growth
and national competitiveness (0.94), that the required
reduction of GHG emissions can only be achieved by in-
creasing the use of nuclear energy (0.89), and that the
protocol should include the largest emitters, such as the
US and developing countries (0.8).
The economy coalition uses two types of scientific ar-
guments; however, as noted earlier, they do not have
a central position in the network. First, the economy
coalition argues that more studies are needed on the
economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol (0.73), fearing
that the protocol could induce unbearable costs for busi-
nesses and consumers. Second, the coalition argues that
the law proposal includes incorrect or unclear calcula-
tions about Finland’s emission targets and demands that
these calculations be corrected (0.73).
The most central argument in the network is that the
Kyoto Protocol will support plans to increase energy ef-
ficiency (1.0). The climate coalition uses this argument
more than the economy coalition. The climate coalition’s
other central arguments are that the protocol will speed
up Finland’s shift to renewable energy (0.84) and, contra-
dicting the economy coalition’s argument, that it will sup-
port economic growth, especially in the long run (0.73).
Three types of scientific arguments are used to back up
the other policy arguments, but again, they occupy a
less central position than the other policy arguments.
First, the climate coalition argues that the protocol will
increase funding for research and development to re-
duce GHG emissions (0.73). Second, the climate coalition
draws on climate science and evidence on the anthro-
pogenic nature of climate change to support the proto-
col. Third, it argues that current economic studies, such
as the impact assessments of the policy options included
in the law proposal, support the implementation of the
protocol (0.62).
Figure 3 illustrates the actor network during the en-
actment of the Finnish Climate Law in 2015. Compared to
2002, the number of actors giving testimonies increased
significantly, from 22 to 64. In addition, while two com-
peting discourse coalitions remain in the discourse net-
work, the coalitions are now more evenly sized. The cli-
mate coalition includes 33 actors and is now bigger than
the economy coalition, which has 31 actors.
Whereas in 2002, the two most central actors were
scientific, all scientific actors are now moderately cen-
tral. Specificministries, business organizations, and trade
unions are now themost central actors, reflecting amore
widespread involvement of organizations from different
sectors. In addition, the scientific actors have now shifted
from the economy coalition to the climate coalition, shar-
ing more arguments with the latter than with the for-
mer. The climate coalition comprises nine scientific ac-
tors. The VTT Technical Research Center (0.72) and the
VATT Institute for Economic Research (0.77), the two re-
search institutes that belonged to the economy coali-
tion in 2002, have changed sides and now belong to the
climate coalition. Other scientific actors in the climate
coalition include the Finnish Climate Change Panel (0.82)
and the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (0.75).
The scientific actors are aligned with ministries, includ-
ing the Ministry of Transport and Communications (0.9);
the Prime Minister’s Office (0.78); and some business-
initiated organizations, such as the Finnish Bioenergy
Association (0.83) and the SolidWaste Association (0.86).
The climate coalition now also includes a large number
of environmental and other NGOs, such as the Finnish
Association for Nature Conservation (0.82) and the devel-
opment NGO Kepa (0.76). Overall, the scientific organiza-
tions of the environment coalition now have a broader
and more powerful set of allies in the climate coalition
than they did in 2002 (cf. Gronow & Ylä-Anttila, 2019;
Gronow et al., 2019).
The economy coalition comprises only two scientific
organizations, which are not central: the Forest Research
Institute (0.65) and MTT Agrifood Research Finland.
These sectoral research institutes are aligned with busi-
ness organizations and trade unions, of which 16 be-
long to the economy coalition. These include the Central
Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (0.91), the Union
for Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (0.76), and
the Forest Owners’ Association of Finland (0.79). The
coalition also includesministries, such as theMinistry for
Economy and Employment (0.93), which is the most cen-
tral actor in the network; the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry (0.74); and the Ministry of Finance (0.74). In ad-
dition, the economy coalition includes one denialist or-
ganization, a small NGO called the Climate Forum (0.68).
While the centrality of scientific arguments was rela-
tively low in 2002, in 2015, they were among the most
central arguments in the discourse network (Figure 4).
The climate coalition uses three types of scientific ar-
guments to support the Finnish Climate Law. First, it
appeals to climate science (0.93), arguing that climate
change legislation should be based on the latest scientific
evidence on climate change. Second, the climate coali-
tion supports giving the Finnish Climate Change Panel a
legal status (0.88), arguing that this will strengthen the
role of scientific knowledge in Finnish climate policymak-
ing. Third, actors in the climate coalition appeal to recent
social scientific studies that point to the need to enact
the Finnish Climate Law (0.82). These studies include sci-
entific reports that have been based on the social, po-
litical, and economic aspects of climate policy. These re-
ports speak to the benefits of implementing the Finnish
Climate Law.
The climate coalition uses these scientific arguments
to back up other policy arguments. The most central
of these other arguments is that the law will improve
transparency and participation in Finnish climate poli-
cymaking (1.0). The law increases different stakehold-
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Figure 3. One-mode network of actors via argument categories during the enactment of the Finnish Climate Law (2015).
Notes: Node size adjusted based on closeness centrality; ties based and weighted based according to congruence.
Modularity: 0.334. Red: scientific organization; blue: business organization/trade union; yellow: government; green: envi-
ronmental NGO; brown: NGO; orange:municipal organization; purple: business; pink: others. Selected actors are labeled to
ensure readability of the figure. The color of each edge is the average of the colors of the two nodes that the edge connects.
ers’ possibilities to participate in the climate change pol-
icy process, and the climate coalition demands that the
background reports and calculations of law proposals
and strategies be made public in the future. The climate
coalition supports the inclusion of the Emissions Trading
System sector in the long-term emission target (0.93)
and argues that enacting the Finnish Climate Law will in-
crease economic growth (0.88) by facilitating companies’
efforts to make low carbon investments.
The economy coalition opposes the enactment of
the Finnish Climate Law. Scientific arguments are also
central in the argumentation of this coalition, and there
are two types. First, the economy coalition stresses that
more studies should be conducted on the economic im-
pacts of the Finnish Climate Law (0.93), as the law could
worsen the cost-efficiency of climate policy. Second, the
coalition states that the Finnish Climate Change Panel
should include wide representation from different re-
search fields (0.67). The coalition emphasizes that the
panel should take the business perspective into account
in its policy recommendations and should, thus, include
representatives from economics and technology studies.
The economy coalition uses these scientific arguments in
conjunctionwith other policy arguments that refer to the
cost of climate policymaking. As in the case of the Kyoto
Protocol, the coalition argues that the law could weaken
economic growth and national competitiveness (0.88)
and would burden the administration (0.88), which is in
contradiction to the plans to streamline the Finnish ad-
ministration. The coalition also opines that climate policy
should mainly be about energy policy (0.88). In Finland,
climate policy has traditionally been closely connected to
energy policy, as the national climate and energy strate-
gies demonstrate.
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Figure 4.One-mode network of arguments via actors during the enactment of the Finnish Climate Law (2015). Notes: Node
size adjusted according to closeness centrality; ties based and weighted according to congruence. Modularity: 0.304. Red:
scientific argument; blue: other policy argument. The color of each edge is the average of the colors of the two nodes that
the edge connects.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
This article used DNA (Leifeld, 2019) to examine the
science–policy interface as a discourse network, focusing
on the position of scientific organizations and arguments
in the networks.
Our results show, first, that from 2002 to 2015, the
Finnish climate change policy process was influenced by
two competing discourse coalitions—the economy and
climate coalitions. Regarding the role of scientific organi-
zations, we show that they are relatively central through-
out the years but that their place in the coalition struc-
ture changes. In 2002, the most central scientific organi-
zationswere part of the dominant economy coalition and
allied with powerful industry interest organizations, min-
istries, and trade unions. These scientific organizations
were research institutes focused on the economy and
technology. The environmental research organizations,
in turn, were less central and belonged to the weaker
climate coalition. By 2015, almost all scientific organi-
zations, including those that had belonged to the econ-
omy coalition, shifted to the now dominant climate coali-
tion and, allied with a large number of NGOs and gov-
ernmental organizations, now support ambitious climate
change legislation.
Second, regarding the role of scientific arguments,
we show that their centrality in the policy debate in-
creases over time. In 2002, scientific arguments were
relatively peripheral. The then-dominant economy coali-
tion’s main arguments were that the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol could weaken national economic compet-
itiveness and that the emission reduction target could be
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achieved only by increasing nuclear power. These posi-
tions were supported by two scientific arguments, as the
coalition demanded more studies on economic impacts
and argued that the calculations determining Finland’s
commitments were unclear and should be revised. The
smaller climate coalition appealed to climate science in
supporting the Kyoto Protocol.
In 2015, scientific arguments were much more cen-
tral to the debate, and both coalitions used them more
than in 2002. Each coalition used the types of scientific
arguments that resonated with their values and political
goals. The climate coalition that had become dominant
argued that the knowledge produced by climate science
and the social sciences supports the enactment of the
Finnish Climate Law, and it demanded a legal mandate
for the scientific Climate Change Panel as an advisory
bodymonitoring the new law. The climate coalition used
these scientific arguments to back up its main claims—
that is, that the law should include a binding emissions
target, including the Emissions Trading System sector,
and that it would be beneficial for the economic growth
and transparency of, as well as participation in, climate
policy. The nowweaker economy coalition argued for the
need for more studies on the economic impacts of the
law and demanded that if the scientific Climate Change
Panel is given legal status, it should include not only cli-
mate scientists but also economists. These science argu-
ments were used to support the coalition’s main claims
that the lawwould be harmful to national economic com-
petitiveness and would constitute an unnecessary ad-
ministrative burden.
This increase in the centrality of scientific arguments
and their use by both coalitions to support their respec-
tive political goals reflects a phenomenon that earlier re-
search has called the politicization of science—that is,
science becoming fuel for more general value struggles
(Brown, 2015; Pielke, 2010; Weingart, 1999; Wesselink
et al., 2013). It is not the case, however, that climate sci-
ence itself would be denied for political reasons by those
opposing stronger climate action. Rather, while the pro-
ponents of the Finnish Climate Law use climate science
to back up their arguments, the opponents’ main argu-
ment is that economic sciences should also be consid-
ered and the economic impacts of the legislation more
thoroughly analyzed.
Our main contribution to the literature on the
science–policy interface has been to show that it can be
fruitful to analyze this interface as a discourse network
constituted by discursive interaction between scientific
organizations and other actors that both use scientific ar-
guments in conjunction with other policy arguments.
This relational approach has enabled us to go beyond
standard techniques, such as quantitative (e.g., count-
ing the appearances of scientific organizations and ar-
guments) and qualitative content analysis of policy tes-
timonies. First, our DNA approach has highlighted the re-
lationship between scientific actors and others, showing
that scientific organizations take part in policy processes
as part of discourse coalitions. These coalitions and the
role of scientific organizations within them can change
over time, as evidenced by the gradual shift of the in-
fluential economic research institutes from the economy
coalition to the climate coalition. The voices of scientific
organizations can also be amplified by the other organi-
zations that belong to the same discourse coalition, as ev-
idenced by themarked increase over time in the number
of NGOs using scientific arguments to defend ambitious
climate change policy.
Second, the relational approach has highlighted the
relationships between scientific and other policy argu-
ments, as well as the changes in these relationships
over time. Scientific arguments were auxiliary to other
policy arguments, such as those defending economic
growth and nuclear energy in 2002, whereas in 2015,
they had become central in the debate, used in con-
junction with arguments such as those demanding long-
term emission targets, as well as transparency of and
increased participation in climate change policymaking
and implementation.
Our results are, broadly speaking, in line with pre-
vious research findings on the role of organizational
coalitions in climate change politics in Finland, even
though these studies used different materials (surveys,
media) and did not focus on the role of science specif-
ically (Gronow, Wagner, & Ylä-Anttila, 2019; Gronow
& Ylä-Anttila, 2019; Teräväinen, 2010). There is, how-
ever, one interesting difference between our results and
those obtained earlier, and observing this difference
leads to a conclusion that may be of general interest to
the increasing number of scholars using DNA to iden-
tify advocacy coalitions. Compared to the studies us-
ing media material, we found the economy coalition to
be larger and stronger. Economic counterarguments to
climate change mitigation are often relatively invisible
in the media (Lester & Hutchins, 2012). Studies have
suggested that their visibility has decreased over time
(Ylä-Anttila et al., 2018); however, they figure promi-
nently in our material on parliamentary consultations.
Those economically minded actors that are active in the
climate change policy domain use strategies such as par-
ticipating in consultations but do not seek media atten-
tion for their arguments (Vesa, Gronow, & Ylä-Anttila,
2020). This shows that the numerous DNA studies us-
ing media material (e.g., Buckton et al., 2019; Leifeld &
Haunss, 2012; Stoddart & Tindall, 2015) may underesti-
mate the strength of some coalitions because these coali-
tions use strategies other than speaking to the media.
Moreover, DNA studies of congressional hearings on cli-
mate change in the US suggest that polarization in the
context of a policy debate occurs over the economic im-
plications of climate change and policy measures such as
the Clean Power Plan, rather than over climate science
(Fisher & Leifeld, 2019; Fisher et al., 2013), even though
in the US media, climate science denial is an important
strategy of the highly visible climate countermovement
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011). This points to a need to tri-
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angulate results based on media analysis using other,
preferably primary materials, such as the consultation
documents used in this article.
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